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DIRECTED ALTRUISM AND ENFORCED RECIPROCITY
IN SOCIAL NETWORKS∗
STEPHEN LEIDER
MARKUS M. MO¨BIUS
TANYA ROSENBLAT
QUOC-ANH DO
We conducted online field experiments in large real-world social networks in
order to decompose prosocial giving into three components: (1) baseline altruism
toward randomly selected strangers, (2) directed altruism that favors friends over
random strangers, and (3) giving motivated by the prospect of future interaction.
Directed altruism increases giving to friends by 52% relative to random strangers,
whereas future interaction effects increase giving by an additional 24% when giv-
ing is socially efficient. This finding suggests that future interaction affects giving
through a repeated game mechanism where agents can be rewarded for grant-
ing efficiency-enhancing favors. We also find that subjects with higher baseline
altruism have friends with higher baseline altruism.
I. INTRODUCTION
Real world social networks provide a natural laboratory to
study prosocial behavior. Friends help each other frequently and
often substantially. In the 1995 General Social Survey, 55% of
Americans reported that they first approached close friends and
family members when they needed to borrow a large sum of money
(Mobius and Szeidl 2007). In a 2007 UK YouGov survey, 48% of
respondents reported lending, on average, $1,800 to friends and
relatives during the past twelve months (YouGov 2007). Similarly,
close friends and relatives are the predominant source of informal
insurance against risk in developing countries (Townsend 1994;
Udry 1994).
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Economists have explored two main explanations of prosocial
behavior—selfless altruism and expectations of reciprocal favors
in future exchanges. Because people tend to interact frequently
with friends toward whom they have the strongest altruistic feel-
ings, these mechanisms are difficult to distinguish empirically.1
In this paper, we use two online field experiments in a real world
social network to solve this identification problem. Our design al-
lows us to selectively switch off the reciprocity mechanism in some
treatments, and thereby separately measure the strength of the
altruism and reciprocity mechanisms.
The ability of our methodology to distinguish between these
two mechanisms has several applications. For example, many re-
searchers have documented that as societies transition to market
economies, market transactions replace bilateral reciprocal ex-
changes, leading to a decline in social capital.2 By using our diag-
nostic games to identify cultures where the social ties are either
heavily reciprocity-based or heavily altruism-based, economists
may be better able to explain differences in the social disrup-
tion caused by markets. Additionally, our finding (described be-
low) that the reciprocal mechanism only applies to transactions
that are efficient suggests a policy use of our techniques. Develop-
ment programs such as microfinance that use social ties to encour-
age lending and insurance may be most effective in communities
where the social networks have a strong reciprocity component,
because relationships based on trading efficiency-enhancing fa-
vors may help direct resources toward efficient uses. Thus, pol-
icymakers could use experiments such as ours to identify areas
where intervention may be most effective.
In our experiments, we distinguish three components of
prosocial giving: (1) baseline altruism toward randomly selected
strangers, (2) directed altruism that favors friends over random
strangers, and (3) giving motivated by the prospect of future
interaction. We begin by directly measuring the social networks
of Harvard undergraduates to identify, for each subject, socially
close direct friends, less close friends of friends, and socially
1. Economists and sociologists use both frequency of interaction (Marmaros
and Sacerdote 2006) and intensity of altruism interchangeably to measure the
strength of social connections (Granovetter 1974, 1985; Marsden and Campbell
1984; Mitchell 1987; Perlman and Fehr 1987; Mathews et al. 1998).
2. See for example Coleman (1993) on the industrial revolution in Western
societies, Vo¨lker (1995) on the change from communism to capitalism in East
Germany, and Yellen (1990) on the increased participation of the Kalahari !Kung
in markets.
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distant strangers. We then conduct a series of online games
where subjects make unilateral allocation decisions for several
types of named partners and one nameless partner (a randomly
selected participant from the subject’s dormitory). The games are
either modified dictator games, as in Andreoni and Miller (2002),
or a new “helping game.” Subjects make multiple decisions but
are paid for one decision selected at random. For some decisions,
neither participant is told which of the decision maker’s choices
was implemented. In these anonymous decisions, the difference
in allocations between friends and strangers allows us to quantify
the magnitude of directed altruism. In particular, we find that
subjects send on average 52% more money to close friends than to
strangers. We also demonstrate that giving to friends is strongly
related to the decision makers’ underlying baseline altruism
toward nameless partners.
For other decisions, both the decision maker and the partner
are informed which of the decision maker’s choices was selected for
payment. We use the difference between this nonanonymous and
the anonymous treatment to measure the separate effect of future
interaction on prosocial behavior. We find that the nature of the
future interaction effect depends crucially on the social welfare
effects of prosocial behavior. When giving increases joint surplus,
subjects increase giving to friends (relative to strangers) by an
additional 24% in the nonanonymous treatment. Thus, directed
altruism is roughly twice as strong as future interaction effects
in determining giving behavior. When giving decreases joint sur-
plus, subjects do not give more to friends in the nonanonymous
treatment. In contrast, the directed altruism effect favors friends
over strangers both when prosocial behavior is socially efficient
and when it is inefficient.
These differential effects of future interaction on prosocial
behavior are well explained by the theory of repeated games.
Karlan et al. (2009) develop a tractable theory for analyzing
repeated games in social networks, which we adapt to our set-
ting and call the enforced reciprocity model. In that model, a
decision maker can safely grant favors (in the form of larger
allocations) to partners when the relationship between them is
stronger and more valuable, because the partner would rather re-
pay the favor than damage the friendship. Granting favors, how-
ever, only benefits both the decision maker and partner when
giving increases social surplus. This conflicts with Benabou and
Tirole’s (2006) model, where individuals give in order to signal
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being of an altruistic type. The signaling model predicts that ex-
cess giving to friends should increase for all the games (and all
exchange rates), because giving still distinguishes altruists from
selfish types. The enforced reciprocity model also predicts that
giving should increase if the decision maker and partner share a
greater number of common friends (controlling for social distance).
We confirm this prediction in our data. This provides further evi-
dence for the enforced reciprocity model and distinguishes it from
related theories such as preference-based reciprocity (Rabin 1993;
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004). This result also highlights
the influence of second-order links and network structure on eco-
nomic decisions.
Last, we show that decision makers who exhibit greater base-
line altruism are treated more generously by their friends. How-
ever, we show that friends do not reward intrinsic kindness, but
rather, that kind people tend to have friends who exhibit greater
baseline altruism themselves.
Our paper builds on a rich experimental literature on other-
regarding preferences and cooperation. Altruistic behavior toward
strangers has been observed in a variety of laboratory contexts
(see Camerer [2003] for an extensive survey). Hoffman, McCabe,
and Smith (1996) suggest that a decrease in perceived social dis-
tance increases donations in dictator games. Our paper reduces
social distance in two ways: (a) we distinguish between giving
to friends and giving to strangers; and (b) we either reveal or
do not reveal which decision is implemented. Our online exper-
imental design is a significant methodological advance because
it provides a practical way to match subjects with their real-
world friends.3 Lab experiments that relax traditional anonymous
matching of strangers typically reveal demographic characteris-
tics such as gender or ethnicity (for example, see Fershtman and
Gneezy [2001]). Very few laboratory experiments explicitly rely
on subjects’ ongoing relationships with their friends as we do
in our nonanonymous treatment. Instead, repeated interactions
are incorporated directly into the experimental design, increasing
prosocial behavior (see Roth and Murninghan [1978] and Murn-
inghan and Roth [1983] for early examples). A notable exception
is the seminal work of Glaeser et al. (2000), who match subjects at
various social distances in a trust game.4 In subsequent research,
3. Our experimental design fits the definition of an artefactual field experiment
from Harrison and List (2004).
4. See also Polzer, Neale, and Glenn (1993) comparing allocations to friends
and strangers in an ultimatum game.
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Goeree et al. (2008) have adopted the anonymous treatment of
our experimental design (using a standard dictator game) and
also find strong evidence for directed altruism in a school network
of teenage girls (also see Bran˜as-Garza et al. [2006] for data from
experiments with European university students). To the best of
our knowledge, our design is the first to distinguish between di-
rected altruism and future interaction effects in social networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II de-
scribes several relevant theories—enforced reciprocity, signaling,
and preference-based reciprocity—and reviews their testable im-
plications. Section III presents the experimental design. Section
IV summarizes the main features of the data. Our empirical
results on directed altruism are presented in Section V. Section VI
analyzes decisions under nonanonymity. In Section VII, we con-
sider two benchmarks comparing the importance and magnitude
of the directed altruism and future interaction effects. Section
VIII shows that friends tend to have similar levels of baseline
altruism. Section IX concludes by discussing the implications of
our results for the theoretical and empirical analysis of prosocial
behavior.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
We briefly review the predictions of three different theories
that explain decision making when there is a prospect of future
interaction. We refer the interested reader to the earlier NBER
working paper for a detailed formal treatment of each theory
(Leider et al. 2007). We assume throughout that there is a
decision maker, M, and a partner, P, who are embedded in a
social network. We calculate the social distance DMP between the
decision maker and the partner as the shortest path connecting
them: for example, two direct friends have a social distance of 1,
whereas a friend of a friend is at distance 2 (see Figure I). The
decision maker’s allocation decisions in the anonymous treatment
(neither decision maker nor partner learns about the decision)
and the nonanonymous treatment (both agents learn about the
decision) are denoted by xMP and x˜MP , respectively (coded so that
a larger x implies greater prosocial behavior).5
We assume, as a starting point, that decision makers have
altruistic preferences whose strength varies with social distance.
5. Therefore, the decision maker’s utility is decreasing in x and the partner’s
utility is increasing in x.
1820 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
SD=1 Flow=1
M P
SD=2 Flow=1
PM
SD=1 Flow=3
M P
SD=2 Flow=3
PM
FIGURE I
Examples to Illustrate Difference between Maximum Network Flow
and Social Distance
All links are assumed to have unit capacity. The examples illustrate the dif-
ferent features of the social network that are captured by social distance and
maximum network flow, respectively: the addition of common friends will neces-
sarily increase flow but can leave social distance unchanged.
We use a simple linear specification to capture decision making in
the anonymous treatment, which is a natural extension of existing
preferences-based altruism models:6
(1) xMP = αZMP + γ1DMP + γM + MP .
We control for observable demographic characteristics of both in-
dividuals (ZMP). The coefficient γM captures the decision maker’s
intrinsic generosity toward all partners (independent of social dis-
tance), which we refer to as his or her baseline altruism. The co-
efficient γ1 determines how the decision maker’s altruism varies
with social distance, which we call directed altruism.
II.A. Enforced Reciprocity
Repeated games provide a natural framework to analyze the
decision maker’s allocation, x˜MP , under the prospect of future in-
teractions. However, repeated games typically admit many equi-
libria even in a two-person setting—this multiplicity problem is
compounded for social networks where hundreds of agents often
interact. Karlan et al. (2009) provide a tractable framework for
6. Andreoni (1990) models altruism as a “warm glow,” whereas Fehr and
Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Charness and Rabin (2002)
focus on preferences over payoff distributions.
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modeling repeated game effects in social networks. They assume
that decision maker and partner share a relationship that is con-
sumed in the future and gives both of them utility VMP . A decision
maker who is more prosocial under nonanonymity compared to
anonymity, such that x˜MP − xMP > 0, grants a favor to the part-
ner and can use the value of the relationship to the partner as
social collateral to enforce repayment of the favor. If the partner
refuses to return the favor the relationship breaks down and both
agents lose the value of the friendship.
In our working paper, we formally show that in the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium the decision maker allocates a larger
amount under nonanonymity compared to anonymity only when
giving is efficient, and thus increases social surplus. In this case,
both the decision maker and the partner keep some of the surplus
created by the favor. In contrast, when giving is inefficient a favor
that has to be repaid makes both the decision maker and the
partner worse off.
We can also show that the difference in allocations between
the nonanonymous and anonymous treatments, x˜MP − xMP , is in-
creasing in the value of the relationship VMP because the decision
maker is willing to grant, and the partner is willing to repay, larger
favors. This motivates the following empirical model of allocation
decisions under nonanonymity:
(2) x˜MP = ηZMP + θxMP + φVMP + υM + MP .
We include the decision maker’s anonymous decision, xMP , as a
covariate, because our enforced reciprocity model predicts devi-
ations from the anonymous benchmark. The model also predicts
that enforced reciprocity and altruism are substitutes (θ < 1): be-
cause the decision maker will give the largest enforceable favor
(when giving is efficient) and the partner will retain some of the
surplus, the decision maker’s marginal utility from giving an ad-
ditional altruistic gift is smaller than in the anonymous case (the
partner is now richer than in the anonymous case).
We consider two proxies for the value of the relationship,
VMP . First, we expect that relationship value decreases with so-
cial distance because a decision maker is less likely to interact
with a socially distant partner in the future. Second, the enforced
reciprocity model of Karlan et al. (2009) suggests maximum net-
work flow as an alternative measure. The maximum flow counts
the number of distinct paths between decision maker and partner
(see Figure I). Network flow captures structural features of the
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social network that are not captured by social distance alone. For
example, having more friends in common increases network flow,
whereas social distance is unchanged. Network flow formalizes a
common intuition in the sociology literature that dense networks
strengthen trust by facilitating informal arrangements (Coleman
1988, 1990). In Karlan et al.’s (2009) enforced reciprocity model,
each common friend increases the social collateral between the
decision maker and the partner. The decision maker is able to
extract repayments for larger favors, because if the partner de-
faults he or she will lose the relationship with all of the common
friends as well as the decision maker. Throughout, we calculate
network flow by only including links that are at most a distance
K = 2 away from the decision maker. Karlan et al. (2009) justify
this choice of a circle of trust of K = 2 by reviewing some of the
existing empirical literature in economics and sociology, such as
Granovetter (1974).
Table I summarizes the main predictions of the enforced reci-
procity model (as well as the signaling- and preference-based reci-
procity models discussed below).
II.B. Signaling
In recent work, Benabou and Tirole (2006) propose a sig-
naling model that provides an alternative theory for explaining
greater generosity to friends under nonanonymity. In their frame-
work, agents care about being perceived as altruistic (rather than
greedy) types, so they act more generously when their actions can
be observed. Moreover, it is reasonable to extend their model to
assume that individuals care more about signaling generosity to
friends than to strangers, because they are more likely to interact
with friends in the future.
A key distinguishing prediction of the signaling model is that
decision makers should increase their allocation decision under
nonanonymity compared to anonymity both when prosocial be-
havior is efficient and when it is inefficient. Larger allocations
are just as good (if not better) signals of generosity when giv-
ing is inefficient as when giving is efficient. Additionally, excess
giving under nonanonymity is independent of the level of altru-
ism in Benabou and Tirole’s (2006) model, because signaling util-
ity and distributional utility are additively separable. This effect
contrasts with the enforced reciprocity model, where altruism and
favors are substitutes.
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TABLE I
TESTABLE PREDICTIONS ABOUT DECISION MAKERS’ ALLOCATION DECISIONS UNDER
NONANONYMITY VERSUS ANONYMITY
Enforced Preference-based
reciprocity Signaling reciprocity
Greater generosity
toward friends (φ > 0)
when giving is
efficient
Yes Yes Yes
Greater generosity
toward friends (φ > 0)
when giving is
inefficient
No Yes No
Altruistic decision
makers are relatively
less generous toward
friends compared to
strangers
Yes No Yes
Maximum network flow
is a separate predictor
of generosity beyond
social distance
Yes No No
Note. We estimate the empirical model x˜MP = ηZ+ θxMP + φVMP + υM + MP , where x˜MP and xMP
are the decision maker’s actions under nonanonymity and anonymity, respectively, and VMP describes the
value of the relationship between decision maker and partner (proxied by social distance).
II.C. Preference-Based Reciprocity
A third possible mechanism for future interaction effects is
preference-based reciprocity. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
develop a psychological game theory model of sequential reci-
procity, where an individual treats kindly (unkindly) those who
have treated/will treat him or her kindly (unkindly). As in en-
forced reciprocity, the decision maker increases his or her alloca-
tion between nonanonymity and anonymity only when giving is
efficient, anticipating that with some probability, assumed to be
decreasing in social distance, the partner may act to benefit the
decision maker.
Under preference-based reciprocity, however, the partner’s
desire to return the decision maker’s favor is intrinsic, rather than
designed to preserve the relationship with the decision maker or
common friends. Therefore, unlike the enforced reciprocity model,
preference-based reciprocity would not predict that the network
flow measure independently correlates with increased generosity
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Wave 1: 
Within-
subject
design
Between-
subject
design
 
Network elicitation Allocation game 
Coordination task  
Wave 2: 
Trivia task Helping game (anon)
nameless partner  
Helping game  (anon)
named partner  
Helping game (nonanon)
named partner 
Dictator games (nonanon)
nameless partner
 
Dictator games (anon)
nameless partner
 
Dictator games (nonanon)
named partner 
Dictator games (anon)
named partner
FIGURE II
Overview of Experimental Design (Waves 1 and 2)
In Wave 1, we randomized whether subjects first made all the nameless deci-
sions or whether they first made all the named decisions. For each named partner
in Wave 1, we randomized whether subjects first submitted their anonymous choice
for that partner or their nonanonymous choice. We also randomized whether a sub-
ject first submitted all anonymous (nonanonymous) choices for all partners on a
single screen, or whether a subject submitted both anonymous and nonanonymous
choices on a separate screen for each partner. Finally, we randomized the order in
which the three different exchange rates were listed on subjects’ screens.
after controlling for the frequency of future interaction (via social
distance).
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Figure II presents the major features of our experimental de-
sign. In order to recruit more subjects and map a larger social net-
work, all communication with subjects was conducted by e-mail
and all choices were submitted on a website (rather than in a
laboratory) that subjects could access with a password through
their own web browsers. We conducted two waves of the experi-
ment. In each wave, we first used a novel task to elicit the social
network truthfully. We then had subjects play an allocation game
with other subjects in the network. In Wave 1, we used modified
dictator games with varying exchange rates, and in Wave 2, we
used a new helping game. In both waves, decision makers first
decided on allocations between themselves and other unnamed
(“nameless”) partners, and then, a few days later, made several
allocations between themselves and named partners (identified
by real first and last name) at various social distances. For both
waves, a single decision was randomly selected for payment and
all players were informed of their earnings by e-mail.
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We conducted two major information treatments, using a
within-subject design in Wave 1 and a between-subjects design
in Wave 2. In these treatments, we varied how much informa-
tion was revealed to both parties at the end of the experiment.
In the “anonymous” treatment, each subject was merely informed
of his or her total payoff for the experiment—neither decision
makers nor partners found out which particular decision was im-
plemented. In the “nonanonymous” treatment, both the decision
maker and the partner were told both their total payoff and which
decision was implemented.
III.A. Design for Wave 1: Coordination Task and Dictator Games
Network Elicitation. To measure the social network, we used
a coordination task to provide subjects incentives to truthfully
report their friendships. Each subject listed his or her ten best
friends and the average amount of time per week he or she spends
with each of them.7 Each time a listed friend also listed the sub-
ject, the subject was paid 50 cents, with probability 0.5 if their
answers about time spent together disagreed, or with probabil-
ity 0.75 if they agreed. We made the expected payoff (25 or 37.50
cents) large enough to give an incentive to list their friends truth-
fully, and small enough to discourage “gaming.” The randomiza-
tion was included to limit disappointment if a subject was only
named by a few people. To define the social network, we say that
two subjects have a direct link if at least one of them named the
other. We call this type of social network the “OR-network.”8
Allocation Game. After measuring the social network, we
randomly assigned each subject the role of decision maker or
partner in the dictator games.9 Each decision maker then played
modified dictator games with a nameless partner randomly
selected from the decision maker’s dormitory.10 He or she was
asked to make allocation decisions for both the anonymous and
7. The choices were 0–30 minutes, 30 minutes to 1 hour, 1–2 hours, 2–4 hours,
4–8 hours, or more than 8 hours.
8. We find similar results using the “AND-network,” where a link exists only if
both subjects name each other. The OR-network has desirable monotonicity prop-
erties: a subject with an above average number of actual friends will have an above
average number of friends in the measured network even if the survey truncates
his true network. This is not always true for the AND-network if truncation forces
subjects to select randomly from a set of equally close friends.
9. In the experimental instructions, we referred to the two roles simply as
player 1 and player 2.
10. The decision maker is told in the instructions that the recipient was se-
lected from his or her dormitory.
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the nonanonymous conditions. The decision maker allocated
50 tokens between him- or herself and the recipient. However,
the value of a token to the decision maker and to the recipient
differed between games. In one case a token was worth 10 cents to
the decision maker, and 30 cents to the recipient (“1:3”), whereas
in a second case they were worth 20 cents to the decision maker
and 20 cents to the recipient (“1:1”), and in a third case they
were worth 30 cents to the decision maker and 10 cents to the
recipient (“3:1”). We can therefore observe allocations when giving
is efficient, neutral, and inefficient. Each decision maker made
allocation choices for each of the three token money exchange
rates.
A few days later, decision makers played in a second round,
in which they were matched in random order with five different
named partners listed using their real first and last names: (1)
a direct friend (social distance SD = 1), (2) a friend of a friend
(SD = 2), (3) a friend of a friend of a friend (SD = 3), (4) a student
in the same staircase/floor who is at least distance 4 removed from
the student (SD ≥ 3), and (5) a randomly selected student from
the same dormitory who falls into none of the above categories.11
Once again, the decision maker was asked to make allocation
decisions in both the anonymous and nonanonymous situations.
The decision maker made allocation decisions under the three
different exchange rates (3:1, 1:1, and 1:3) for each partner.
To control for experimenter demand effects of presentation,
we randomized whether subjects first made all the nameless de-
cisions or first made all the named decisions. For each named
partner in Wave 1, we randomized whether subjects first sub-
mitted their anonymous choice or their nonanonymous choice.
We also randomized whether a subject first submitted all anony-
mous (nonanonymous) choices for all partners on a single screen,
or whether a subject submitted anonymous and nonanonymous
choices on separate screens for each partner. Finally, we random-
ized the order in which the three different exchange rates were
listed on subjects’ screens.
Note that each decision maker made six decisions for each
partner involving three different exchange rates under anony-
mous and nonanonymous treatments (36 decisions in total). This
11. Our selection algorithm used the “AND”-network definition for this step.
Because social distance always (weakly) decreases when using the “OR”-social
distance definitions, the numbers of observations for columns (1) to (4) in Table II
are not equal.
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made it very difficult for a participant to identify which decision
was chosen ex post from her earnings.12
III.B. Design for Wave 2: Trivia Task and Helping Game
Network Elicitation. To focus on relationships with a high
frequency of interaction, we developed the trivia task technique
to elicit the social network for the second wave. Each subject listed
ten friends about whom they would answer questions. Over sev-
eral weeks, several of the listed friends were randomly selected
and each were sent an e-mail asking him or her to answer a
multiple choice question about him- or herself (e.g., “What time
do you get up in the morning?”). Subjects then received e-mail
directing them to a web page where they had fifteen seconds to
answer the same question about their friends. If the subjects and
their friends submitted identical answers, they both won a prize.
The trivia task provides subjects with incentives to list friends
that the subjects spend time with frequently (and thus are more
likely to know the friends’ habits).
Allocation Game. For the second wave we used a new allo-
cation game to capture the kind of helping behavior that occurs
in natural relationships, where an individual might face different
opportunity costs to help a friend who needs a favor. In the help-
ing game, each decision maker was endowed with $45, and each
partner was endowed with $0. The decision makers were asked
to report the maximum price that they would be willing to pay
in order for the partner to receive a gain of $30. A random price
between $0 and $30 was determined, and if their maximum will-
ingness to pay was equal or greater than the random price the
partner received $30 and the random price was deducted from
the decision maker’s endowment. Otherwise, the decision maker’s
payoff equalled the endowment of $45, and the partner’s payoff
equaled the endowment of $0.
Effectively, the decision makers revealed how much they
valued a $30 gain for the partners. As in the first design, subjects
12. Although in principle the dictator could reveal his or her allocation to the
partner after the experiment in the anonymous case, because dictators were not
told which decision was selected for payment, they would have had to make choices
with unique payoffs so that they would know which partner to inform, and remem-
ber those choices several weeks later when payments were made. Postexperiment
breaking of anonymity is also less of a concern in the Helping Game (described
in the next section), because the partners could not verify which subjects helped
them, because all help yields the same payoff; nor could they verify the helpers
cutoff, only that it was higher than the unknown price.
1828 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
made two rounds of decisions: first they played with a nameless
partner, and then they played with four named partners. Also, we
chose a between-subjects design for the anonymity manipulation:
the decisions for the nameless partner were always anonymous,
whereas in the second round decisions were either all anonymous
or all nonanonymous. Every subject played both roles in the game,
that of a decision maker and that of a partner, which allowed
us to test whether the baseline altruism of the recipient affects
the decision maker’s choice. To control for experimenter demand
effects of presentation, we randomized the order of named
partners.
IV. DATA DESCRIPTION
IV.A. Dictator Games
In December 2003, Harvard sophomores, juniors, and seniors
at two dormitories were recruited through posters, flyers, and
mail invitations. Subjects who logged onto the website were asked
to (1) list their best friends’ names using the coordination task
and (2) fill in a basic demographic questionnaire. Subjects were
required to name friends from the two participating dormitories.
Subjects were paid their earnings from the coordination task, plus
a flat payment of $10 for completing the survey. They were also
eligible to earn cash prizes in a raffle, adding $3 (on average)
in earnings. Experimental earnings were added to the student’s
electronic cash card.13
Of the 806 students in those two dormitories, 569 (71%) par-
ticipated in the social network survey. The survey generated 5,690
one-way links. Of those, 2,086 links were symmetric links where
both subjects named each other.14 The resulting OR-network con-
sists of a single connected component with 802 subjects, forming
a comprehensive map of the social network.
The dictator game stage was conducted over a one-week pe-
riod in May 2004. Half of all subjects who participated in the coor-
dination stage were randomly selected to be decision makers. Out
of 284 eligible decision makers invited, 193 participated in round
1 (decisions for nameless partners) and 181 of those participated
13. These cards are widely used on campus as a cash substitute, and many
off-campus merchants accept the cards.
14. For symmetric links, the two subjects’ assessment of the amount of time
spent together in a typical week did not differ more than one category out of five
in 80% of all cases.
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in round 2 (decisions for named partners). The participants were
representative of the coordination stage sample composition.
IV.B. The Helping Game
Information on social networks was collected in December
2004 through an online trivia task advertised on the popular
student social website facebook.com.15 A total of 2,360 students
signed up, generating 12,782 links between participants out of
23,600 total links16 with 6,880 symmetric links. In total, 5,576
out of the 6,389 undergraduates at Harvard either participated
in the trivia task or were named by a participant. Upperclass-
men had higher participation rates, with only 34% of freshman
responding, but with 45%, 52%, and 53% of sophomores, juniors,
and seniors participating, respectively. The social “OR”-network
of 5,576 individuals contains a single component (meaning all in-
dividuals are connected) with a mean path length of 4.2 between
participants.
The helping game stage was conducted in May 200617 over a
one-week period with all juniors and seniors who had participated
in the previous academic year’s trivia task. A total of 776 subjects
participated in the first part of the helping game (decisions for
nameless partners), and 695 subjects completed the second part
(decisions for named partners).
IV.C. Summary Statistics
Table II shows the mean actions of decision makers for the dic-
tator and helping games, for both the anonymous and nonanony-
mous treatments. Two patterns are clear: in all games and in both
treatments, the decision makers’ generosity toward their partners
decreased with social distance, and for any game and at any so-
cial distance, the decision makers’ generosity is always higher
under nonanonymity than under anonymity. Differences between
treatments are significant across all social distances in the dicta-
tor game, and for social distances 1 and 2 in the helping game.
For both games and both treatments, decision makers’ allocation
choices are significantly larger for partners who are direct friends
than for partners at any other social distance.
15. More than 90% of Harvard undergraduates were already members of
facebook.com at that time.
16. Subjects could also list nonparticipants in our experiment as friends.
17. During both waves of the experiment, the network information was also
used for other experiments.
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TABLE II
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DECISION MAKERS’ ACTIONS IN DICTATOR
AND HELPING GAMES
SD = 1 SD = 2 SD = 3 SD = 4 SD = 5 Nameless
Anonymous treatment
Dictator game (N = 206) (N = 286) (N = 312) (N = 97) (N = 4) (N = 193)
Ex. rate 1:3 19.19 16.80 15.14 12.20 12.50 17.42
(19.64) (19.30) (18.79) (15.47) (25.00) (18.21)
Ex. rate 1:1 11.96 10.79 9.39 8.79 6.25 11.61
(13.53) (12.68) (11.89) (10.25) (12.50) (12.83)
Ex. rate 3:1 8.03 7.28 5.66 6.15 0.00 8.31
(13.55) (12.88) (11.10) (10.72) (0.00) (13.23)
Helping game (N = 876) (N = 149) (N = 73) (N = 181) (N = 78) (N = 776)
12.77 8.97 7.14 7.68 7.09 9.52
(8.14) (7.11) (6.80) (7.16) (6.95) (7.24)
Nonanonymous treatment
Dictator game (N = 206) (N = 288) (N = 313) (N = 99) (N = 4) (N = 193)
Ex. rate 1:3 24.32 21.67 19.79 14.80 37.50 19.87
(18.91) (18.75) (18.54) (15.72) (25.00) (18.21)
Ex. rate 1:1 16.33 14.62 13.99 12.16 18.75 13.98
(12.90) (12.34) (12.45) (10.68) (12.50) (12.82)
Ex. rate 3:1 10.52 9.88 9.18 10.15 0.00 9.62
(13.56) (13.17) (13.18) (12.77) (0.00) (13.80)
Helping game (N = 625) (N = 96) (N = 42) (N = 132) (N = 62)
14.54 11.28 9.26 8.83 8.11
(8.13) (7.25) (7.04) (7.28) (6.69)
Notes. Table shows averages of number of passed tokens (dictator games) and average cutoffs (helping
game) by social distance (OR-network). Standard deviations are in parentheses. Nameless refers to matches
between the decision maker and the partner where the identity of the partner is not known to the decision
maker.
In the dictator game with the 1:3 (efficient) exchange rate, the
decision maker passes an average of 19.19 tokens to a direct friend
versus 12.20 tokens to a partner at social distance 4. With an (in-
efficient) exchange rate of 3:1, the decision maker passes only
8.03 versus 6.15 tokens, respectively. In the nonanonymous treat-
ment, for all social distances, the decision maker passes about
4 to 5 more tokens when altruism is efficient and about 2 to 4
more tokens when altruism is inefficient. In the helping game’s
anonymous treatment, the average willingness to pay is $12.77
for a direct friend, and decreases to $7.09 for a partner at social
distance 4. Nonanonymity increases the cutoff by approximately
$2 across social distances.
Curiously, in the anonymous treatment for all the dictator
games and in the helping game, nameless partners are treated
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more generously than are friends of friends, despite the fact that
the expected social distance of a randomly chosen partner is at
least 3. In the nonanonymous treatment, on the other hand, the
contributions to nameless partners closely track contributions
to named partners at distance 3. The average level of giving to
nameless partners in our dictator games is similar to the results
reported in Andreoni and Miller (2002). Nameless partners are
given 34.8%, 23.2%, and 16.6% of the token endowment in the
1:3, 1:1, and 3:1 exchange rates, respectively, in our experiments,
where nameless partners were given 32%, 24.3%, and 20% of the
token endowment in the equivalent treatments of Andreoni and
Miller (2002).
We can interpret nameless decisions under anonymity as the
decision makers’ baseline or unconditional generosity, because
they have no information about the partners. Our data repli-
cate the well-known finding of Andreoni and Miller (2002) and of
Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007) that individuals are highly
heterogenous in their unconditional altruism. In particular, we
find that many subjects are perfectly selfish: in the three dictator
games, 28%, 46%, and 64% of subjects pass zero tokens, whereas
in the helping game, 20% set a cutoff of zero dollars.
V. ANONYMITY AND DIRECTED ALTRUISM
In this section, we use the anonymous treatments to analyze
how decision makers’ altruistic preferences vary with social dis-
tance. In Section II, we motivated the following specification for
estimating the strength of directed altruism:
(1) xMP = αZ+ γ1DMP + γM + MP .
Recall that xMP is the decision maker’s action in the anonymous
treatment. Because agents’ actions are bounded below by zero
and above by fifty in the dictator games, and by zero and thirty in
the helping game, we use Tobit regressions to estimate equation
(1). We exploit the fact that we observe multiple actions for
each decision maker in the anonymous treatment, and control
for unobserved heterogeneity in the decision maker’s baseline
altruistic type γM by including random effects.18 We control for
the social distance, DMP , between the decision maker and the
18. Our results are very similar when we estimate equation (1) using standard
random effects or fixed effects GLS.
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partner by including dummy variables SD1 (meaning a direct
friend at social distance SD = 1) to SD5 (meaning social distance
SD = 5). The omitted categories are SD4 for the dictator games
and SD5 for the helping game.19 The estimated coefficient on
SD1 in a dictator game, for example, should be interpreted as
the number of extra tokens that the decision maker passes to
a direct friend compared to a distant partner in the anonymous
treatment, whereas the estimated coefficient on SD2 captures
directed altruism toward a friend of a friend. The estimates of the
Tobit regression for all of the dictator games and for the helping
game are reported in the odd-numbered columns of Table III.
We also estimate the specification with additional covariates
and report the results in the even-numbered columns of Table III.
We include the decision maker’s action toward a nameless player
in the anonymous treatment as a proxy for the decision maker’s
baseline altruistic type γM. In the helping game, we can also con-
trol for the partner’s baseline altruistic type by including the part-
ner’s nameless decision (because all subjects played both roles in
the helping game). Furthermore, we added dummy variables for
both players’ gender, their class (sophomores, juniors, or seniors),
and whether they share a staircase (dictator game) or a dormitory
(helping game).20
RESULT 1. Baseline altruism and directed altruism are correlated.
Subjects who give more to nameless partners also give more
to specific named partners.
The two variables that consistently and strongly predict how
generously a decision maker treats a partner in her social network
are the social distance from the partner and the generosity dis-
played toward a nameless partner. Looking across all regression
specifications, for both the dictator games and the helping game,
each one-unit increase in generosity toward a nameless partner is
associated with a 0.56 to 1.40 unit increase in generosity toward
a named player. Because the nameless decision and the named
decisions were elicited one week apart, this continuity indicates a
substantial degree of stability in the decision makers’ preferences
over time. Because the effect of “nameless altruism” on “named
19. The social network that we used for the second experiment is much larger
because it potentially involves all Harvard undergraduates. Therefore, the maxi-
mum social distance between subjects is higher.
20. Because the participation rate was lower for the helping game, the “same
entryway” dummy variable is less useful.
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altruism” is fairly close to 1, we view the nameless decision of a
decision maker as a useful proxy measure of his or her baseline al-
truism, a heterogeneous trait that strongly influences the decision
maker’s action toward specific named partners.
RESULT 2. Close social ties induce directed altruism. Allocations
to friends are substantially higher than allocations to distant
partners/strangers.
Moreover, social distance also matters greatly: decision mak-
ers are substantially more generous to direct friends than to
partners located at greater social distance. Generosity decreases
quickly and monotonically with social distance, although the esti-
mated coefficients on SD2 and SD3 are not significantly different
from each other for all games. Given the three exchange rates in
the dictator games, the distance coefficients are of similar abso-
lute magnitude, which implies that decision makers are making
a greater relative sacrifice in the case of inefficient altruism.
Interestingly, neither the subjects’ gender nor their geo-
graphic proximity has a significant effect on generosity. However,
the signs of the estimated gender coefficients for the decision
maker are consistent with Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001),
who found that men are more likely to exhibit social surplus–
maximizing preferences: they are more generous in dictator games
when giving is efficient and less generous when giving is ineffi-
cient. College juniors are somewhat more selfish than are sopho-
mores and seniors; however, most of the coefficients on the class
dummies are insignificant.
VI. NONANONYMITY AND FUTURE INTERACTION EFFECTS
We now examine how a decision maker’s allocation changes
under nonanonymity (i.e., both the decision maker and the part-
ner are told which choice was selected for payment) and discuss
which model—enforced reciprocity, signaling, or preference-based
reciprocity—best fits our results.
VI.A. Graphical Analysis
In Figure III we analyze the change in allocations (for the
same named partner) between the nonanonymous treatment
and the anonymous treatment. Because our helping game was
a between-subjects design, we can only perform this exercise for
dictator decisions. We divide decision makers into five groups
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FIGURE III
Difference between Number of Passed Tokens in the Nonanonymous and
Anonymous Treatments in the Dictator Game by Social Distance
For each decision maker/partner pair, the difference between the number of
tokens allocated in the nonanonymous and the anonymous treatments was calcu-
lated. Bars show average difference grouped by the decision maker’s contribution
level in the anonymous treatment and by social distance. The number of subjects
in each group is presented below the bar.
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depending on their generosity in the anonymous treatment (0 to
9, 10 to 19, etc.), where the most selfish subjects passed between
0 and 9 tokens. We then plot the average number of extra tokens
passed in the nonanonymous treatment versus the anonymous
treatment, x˜MP − xMP , by group and by social distance (a proxy
for relationship value VMP).21
Decision makers substantially increase their action from the
anonymous treatment to the nonanonymous treatment, except
the most generous under anonymity.22 This effect is strongest,
up to ten extra tokens, when the decision maker is selfish and
when giving is efficient. The effect is half as large when giving is
inefficient, where decision makers pass at most five extra tokens.
The main insight from this graph is that the nonanonymity
effect is large for close friends and declines with social distance
when giving is efficient (and is also somewhat present when giv-
ing is neutral). However, when giving is inefficient, the decision
makers’ additional contributions are quite small, and do not de-
crease with social distance for four out of the five groups. This
result provides some preliminary evidence in support of the en-
forced reciprocity and preference-based reciprocity mechanisms
and against the signaling mechanism.
The graph also suggests that directed altruism and the
nonanonymity effect are substitutes: controlling for the strength
of a relationship (by fixing either social distance or maximum net-
work flow), we find that the nonanonymity effect decreases mono-
tonically in most cases, as decision makers become more generous
in the anonymous treatment.
VI.B. Tobit Regressions
In Section II.A, we motivated the following specification for
the nonanonymous condition:
(2) x˜MP = ηZ+ θxMP + φVMP + υM + MP,
where x˜MP is the decision maker’s action in the nonanonymous
treatment when matched with a specific named partner P. We
again use panel Tobit regressions to account for censoring and
to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the decision maker’s
21. In the NBER working paper we use network flow as an alternative proxy
with qualitatively identical results.
22. Even in this case, the majority of decision makers do not decrease their
action—the negative averages result from a few decision makers decreasing their
contributions substantially in the nonanonymous treatment.
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response to the nonanonymous treatment. We proxy for the
strength of the decision maker’s relationship with the partner,
VMP , by including either social distance dummies or the maxi-
mum network flow measure.23 The omitted social distance is SD4
for the dictator games and SD5 for the helping game. The esti-
mated coefficient on SD1 in a dictator game, for example, should
be interpreted as the number of extra tokens that the decision
maker passes to a direct friend under nonanonymity compared to
the number of extra tokens that he or she passes to a stranger un-
der nonanonymity. All of our regressions control for the academic
class of the decision maker and of the partner, because we expect
the nonanonymity effect to be smaller for juniors and (especially)
seniors, because the participants are less likely than sophomores
to interact with each other in the future. On the right-hand side
we also include the decision maker’s action toward a nameless
partner in the nonanonymous treatment as a proxy for the ran-
dom effect υM that captures heterogeneity in how decision makers
respond to nonanonymity.
Importantly, we control for the decision maker’s intrinsic al-
truism toward the same partner P by including her decision in
the anonymous treatment, xMP , on the right-hand sides of all of
our regressions. This inclusion poses a problem for the helping
game given its between-subject design, because for no decision
maker/partner pair in the nonanonymous treatment do we ob-
serve the decision maker’s choice for that partner in the anony-
mous treatment. Therefore, we estimate it by running an auxiliary
random-effects Tobit regression with data from the anonymous
treatment, and include social distance dummies and the same
set of covariates Z (nameless decision, class dummies) as in our
empirical specification of the nonanonymity mechanism.
For each of the three dictator games and for the helping game,
we estimate three variants of our empirical model. We first use
only social distance to proxy for the strength of a decision maker’s
relationship to the partner, then use only maximum network flow,
and finally use both measures in the same regression. All results
are reported in Table IV.
RESULT 3. The observability of decisions by partners increases giv-
ing more for friends than for strangers. The differential effect
is only induced when giving is efficient; therefore, the prospect
of future interactions increases the surplus created.
23. In one specification, we include both measures in the same regression.
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Our main finding is that, controlling for a decision maker’s
anonymous action, her response to nonanonymity increases with
the strength of the relationship to the partner, but only if giv-
ing is efficient (i.e., surplus-increasing). This is true regardless of
whether we proxy for the strength of a relationship using social
distance or maximum network flow. Note that this result is consis-
tent with both the enforced reciprocity and the preference-based
reciprocity mechanisms, but not with the signaling mechanism
(which predicts excess generosity toward friends for all exchange
rates).
The magnitude of the nonanonymity effect is large, particu-
larly in the dictator game with exchange rate 1:3. In this game,
decision makers increase their action by 4.18 tokens when their
partners are direct friends as opposed to socially distant partners
(statistically significant at the 1% level). The social closeness ef-
fect is smaller, but still significantly different from zero, at the 5%
level for friends of friends (SD2) in the efficient dictator game.24
Our results also provide some evidence for enforced, rather
than preference-based, reciprocity.
RESULT 4. The nonanonymity effect increases with maximum net-
work flow.
In Table IV we estimate a specification for each game includ-
ing both social distance dummies and maximum network flow as
covariates. For both the efficient dictator game and the helping
game, we find that the coefficients on the social distance dummies
decrease and become insignificant when we add network flow,
whereas the coefficient on flow remains significant for the helping
game. Additionally, for the helping game, a likelihood ratio test re-
jects the specification excluding network flow in favor of the spec-
ification with both social distance and network flow (p < .01).25
We also estimate a specification for the dictator game using
network flow for allocations to direct friends, presented in Table V,
to further demonstrate that network flow is capturing information
about allocations not included in social distance (because here all
partners have a social distance of one). Moreover, for direct friends,
24. In contrast, when we tested for directed altruism, we did not find such a
strong effect for friends of friends.
25. For all three dictator games and the helping game, we cannot reject the
specification with only network flow in favor of the specification with both network
flow and social distance (p > .40 for all specifications).
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TABLE V
EFFECTS OF “AVERAGE TIME SPENT PER WEEK” AND NETWORK FLOW ON DECISION
MAKERS’ GENEROSITY TOWARD DIRECT FRIENDS UNDER NONANONYMITY
(DICTATOR GAME ONLY)
Dictator 1:3 Dictator 1:1 Dictator 3:1
(1) (2) (3)
Anonymous pass 0.25 0.238 0.474
(0.063)∗∗ (0.211) (0.115)∗∗
Network flow 0.676 −0.024 0.155
(0.306)∗ (0.395) (0.262)
Average time spent per week −0.328 −0.089 −0.060
(0.368) (0.488) (0.323)
Const. 12.131 13.946 4.998
(3.640)∗∗ (5.493)∗ (3.286)
Obs. 206 206 206
Notes. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of tokens
passed by the decision maker to a direct friend in the nonanonymous dictator games. All specifications are
estimated as Tobit regressions with decision-maker random effects. “Anonymous action” denotes the decision
maker’s action for the specific partner in the anonymous treatment. Network flow is calculated for a circle of
trust K = 2. Average time spent per week is a categorical variable which takes the values 0 (less than half an
hour per week), 1 (30 minutes to 1 hour), 2 (1 hour to 2 hours), 3 (2 hours to 4 hours), 4 (4 hours to 8 hours),
and 5 (more than 8 hours a week).
Significance levels: †: 10%; ∗: 5%; ∗∗: 1% .
we can include a control for the amount of time that the decision
maker spends with the partner, because this would be an aspect
of the relationship possibly omitted by social distance that would
still be consistent with the preference-based model of reciprocity.26
We find that when giving is efficient, greater network flow in-
creases the decision maker’s generosity toward a direct friend un-
der nonanonymity, even when we control for time spent together.
Thus, network flow predicts generous allocations beyond the social
distance information. Moreover, the estimated coefficient on time
spent together is consistently insignificant and negative. We inter-
pret these findings as evidence for the enforced reciprocity model.
RESULT 5. The nonanonymity effect and directed altruism are sub-
stitutes. Altruistic individuals have a smaller change in allo-
cations under nonanonymity than selfish individuals.
We also find that the estimated coefficients on the decision
maker’s anonymous action, xMP , are always less than one, which
26. However, the measure of time spent together is uncorrelated with our
network flow measure for direct friends (ρ = .03). Thus, any predictive power of
network flow appears not to relate to the frequency of interaction.
DIRECTED ALTRUISM AND ENFORCED RECIPROCITY 1843
TABLE VI
RELATIVE MAGNITUDES OF DIRECTED ALTRUISM AND NONANONYMITY EFFECTS AS
PERCENTAGES OF ALL THE DECISION MAKERS’ AVERAGE NAMELESS ACTION AND AS
PERCENTAGES OF A STANDARD DEVIATION IN NAMELESS ACTIONS
Directed altruism relative to Effect of nonanonymity relative to
SD1 SD2 SD3 SD1 SD2 SD3 Network flow
Dictator game (1:3)
Average 52 8 −8 24 18 3 19
Standard dev. 39 8 −4 14 10 2 11
Dictator game (1:1)
Average 52 16 3 21 12 9 10
Standard dev. 41 14 5 24 14 10 11
Dictator game (3:1)
Average 95 49 43 −7 8 −3 −6
Standard dev. 48 25 23 −4 4 −1 −3
Helping game
Average 88 36 12 35 13 19 30
Standard dev. 192 82 28 69 25 38 59
Notes. An “average” row is calculated by dividing estimates for directed altruism (Table III) and the
effect of nonanonymity (Table IV) by the average nameless decision in the anonymous treatment (Table II,
“Nameless” column). A “standard deviation” row is determined by calculating the increase in nameless decision
(measured in standard deviations) that would have a predicted increase in choice equal to the estimates for
directed altruism and nonanonymity. For the “network flow” column we report the estimated effect of a one-
standard-deviation increase in network flow (equal to 10 units of network flow for “circle of trust” K = 2).
implies that directed altruism and the decision maker’s response
to nonanonymity are indeed substitutes. The total difference be-
tween the nonanonymous allocation and the anonymous alloca-
tion will be smaller for a more altruistic subject than for a selfish
subject. This conclusion is also consistent with the enforced reci-
procity model.
VII. COMPARING ALTRUISM TO ENFORCED RECIPROCITY
Having established that both directed altruism and enforced
reciprocity play a substantial role in determining allocation
decisions when subjects are connected through a social network,
we now attempt to benchmark the relative importance of each
effect, compared to baseline altruism, for each condition we
study. In Table VI, we divide the estimated coefficients on social
distance dummies (SD1 to SD3) from both the anonymous (i.e.,
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measuring directed altruism) and the nonanonymous (i.e., mea-
suring enforced reciprocity) allocations by the average generosity
toward nameless partners in the anonymous treatment. In
other words, we calculate what percent of the baseline altruism
effect (relative to selfishness) the network effects represent. For
the nonanonymous case, we also include the estimated effect
of a one-standard-deviation increase in network flow. Directed
altruism toward friends is equal to 52% of the average nameless
generosity shown in the efficient dictator game, and is equal
to 88% for the helping game. When altruism is inefficient,
the directed altruism effect almost equals average nameless
generosity (a 95% increase)—nearly double the magnitude of
the efficient case (although, recall that the absolute increase
in tokens is slightly smaller). Social distance, therefore, is as
important a determinant of a subject’s generosity as his or her
baseline altruism, particularly when giving is inefficient.
In the nonanonymous treatment, friends receive an extra
transfer of surplus, equal to almost 24% of average nameless gen-
erosity for the efficient dictator game and about 35% of nameless
generosity for the helping game. Friends of friends receive an ex-
tra transfer of about 18% of nameless generosity in the efficient
dictator game. We find a similar pattern, but with slightly smaller
magnitudes, for the neutral dictator game. Taken all together, the
effect of nonanonymity is about half as large as the directed al-
truism effect.
Additionally, the nonanonymity effect is generally weaker for
decision makers who are juniors and seniors: the signs on the
junior and senior dummies are consistently negative, although
they are not always statistically significant. This finding is consis-
tent with our model of enforced reciprocity, because the length of
the future relationship (and, thus, its value) is potentially shorter
(lower) for upperclassmen, because they will live in the same dorm
for a shorter time.
We also consider a different benchmark for the magnitude of
directed altruism and enforced reciprocity: how large an increase
in baseline altruism (i.e., how many standard deviations) would
it take to equal the effect of social connections?27 Therefore, in
Table VI, we also report the estimated coefficients on SD1, SD2,
SD3, and network flow as percentages of the standard deviation
27. This measure is used in Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman, Kariv,
and Markovits (2007).
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of the distribution of nameless decisions. We find that greater so-
cial proximity to the partner in the anonymous dictator games
moves the decision maker’s generosity by at least 0.39 standard
deviation, and by a maximum of 1.93 standard deviations in the
anonymous helping game. Similarly, the effect of enforced reci-
procity by this comparison represents an additional increase in
generosity almost half as large as the altruism effect for the effi-
cient dictator game and the helping game (a change of 0.14 and
0.69 standard deviation, respectively).
VIII. CORRELATION IN ALTRUISTIC PREFERENCES
Our design allows us to analyze whether subjects who are
more altruistic also have friends who are more altruistic. We sep-
arate decision makers into (approximate) quintiles based on their
choices for nameless partners. Tables VII and VIII present the
resulting distributions of friends’ generosity.
RESULT 6. Friends sort by baseline altruism. Subjects with a high
level of baseline altruism have more friends with a high level
of baseline altruism, whereas selfish subjects have more self-
ish friends.
First, we find that altruistic and selfish subjects have the
same number of friends.28 However, a subject’s baseline altruism
is correlated with the baseline altruism of his or her friends (χ2
test: DG p < .001, HG p < .01). That is, selfish subjects have a
greater number of selfish friends, and fewer altruistic friends,
whereas altruists have fewer selfish friends and a greater number
of altruistic friends. In particular, the most altruistic quintile in
the helping game has 25% more highly altruistic friends than any
other group; in the dictator game, the two most altruistic groups
had over 20% more highly altruistic friends than any other
group. Moreover, a subject’s friends’ mean nameless allocation
choice increases with the subject’s baseline altruism. The most
altruistic subjects have friends that are 25% more altruistic than
the most selfish subjects in the dictator game, and 14% more
altruistic in the helping game. Using t-tests, the third, fourth,
and fifth quintiles are significantly different from the first in
the helping game, and the fourth and fifth are different from the
first in the dictator game. A nonparametric equality-of-medians
28. The same holds for the number of people who list the subject as a friend.
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TABLE IX
REGRESSING AVERAGE ALLOCATION TO PARTNERS FROM DIRECT FRIENDS
ON BASELINE ALTRUISM
Helping game
(1) (2)
Partner’s nameless decision ∈ [1, 5] 1.048 0.357
(1.02) (0.96)
Partner’s nameless decision ∈ [6, 12] 3.074 0.545
(0.93)∗∗ (0.91)
Partner’s nameless decision ∈ [13, 15] 4.567 0.521
(0.92)∗∗ (0.98)
Partner’s nameless decision ∈ [16, 30] 5.275 −0.384
(1.17)∗∗ (1.27)
Decision maker’s nameless choice −0.474
(0.054)∗∗
Const. 9.747∗∗ 7.679∗∗
(0.73)∗∗ (0.73)∗∗
Obs. 549 549
Notes. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is a partner’s average allo-
cation in anonymous treatment from decisions made by friends.
test rejects the hypothesis that the five quintiles are drawn from
distributions with the same median (DG p = .039, HG p < .026).
It seems that either subjects prefer to become friends with people
who have similar social preferences, or their social preferences
become more similar after they initiate a friendship.
An important consequence of the correlation in friends’ base-
line altruism is that it pays to be generous. For the anonymous
treatment of the helping game, Table IX (column (1)) displays the
results of regressing the average allocation to partners from de-
cisions made by direct friends on the partners’ baseline altruism
(by quintile): partners with higher baseline altruism have sub-
stantially higher earnings. For example, direct friends of the most
altruistic partners set the cutoff more than five dollars higher
than the direct friends of the most selfish partners. Interestingly,
this effect is entirely due to kinder partners having nicer friends,
and is not due to generally kind partners being treated more nicely
by their friends: we have already shown in our directed altruism
regressions in Table III that decision makers do not treat gener-
ous partners better. Indeed, when we also control for the average
baseline altruism of the decision makers in Table IX (column (2)),
the partners’ baseline altruism no longer predicts their earnings
from friends’ decisions.
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IX. CONCLUSION
We use large field experiments in real-world social networks
to jointly measure two explanations of prosocial behavior: the
prospect of future interaction and directed altruism. We find sup-
port for both mechanisms, although the future interaction effect
is half as strong as the directed altruism effect. The mechanisms
also have different welfare effects: directed altruism promotes
equitable allocations, whereas enforced reciprocity promotes effi-
cient allocations.
Our results suggest that it is difficult to measure the impor-
tance of norms of reciprocity empirically (based on dynamic game
effects) without first measuring underlying directed altruism. For
example, in empirical studies of informal lending and risk shar-
ing, it may be as important to measure directed altruism across
social ties (using diagnostic games) as it is to observe cash and in-
kind transfers. Although both directed altruism and enforced reci-
procity suggest that capital in small communities will more likely
be directed toward close friends and relatives, the relative impor-
tance of altruism over reciprocity may suggest that resources are
not being allocated efficiently to the most profitable projects. A
better understanding of the strength and reach of altruistic ties
within and across families can help policy makers target outside
transfers more effectively.29
Our result that friends cluster by baseline altruism raises
another interesting question for future research: do our friends
shape our social preferences (treatment effect), or do we seek
out friends with similar social preferences (selection effect)? This
could help explain to what extent the distribution of preferences,
as observed in the laboratory by Andreoni and Miller (2002) and
Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007), is endogenous. In Leider
et al. (forthcoming), we provide preliminary evidence against se-
lection based on altruistic type. When we elicit beliefs of partners
about the generosity of their friends toward them and toward
anonymous others, we find that partners expect to be treated
better by their friends, but subjects do not incorporate their
friends’ specific baseline altruism into their beliefs. Therefore, it
appears that although friends tend to cluster by their altruistic
type, their beliefs about decision makers’ generosity are mostly
29. Angelucci et al. (2008) show that random positive income shocks from
the Progresa natural experiment are shared within rather than across extended
families (consistent with a model of directed altruism).
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driven by expectations of directed altruism. Future research
can utilize carefully designed field experiments to measure the
relative strength of selection versus social interaction in the
formation and evolution of social preferences.
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